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1. Introduction
In many ways, I don’t much resemble the computer on which I am typing this
paper. It is shiny, draws electricity from an outlet, is playing the Hamilton
soundtrack, is composed of many circuits and was produced in a variety of
factories. Of course, we are alike in many ways as well. We are both in my
office, we are both located in space, we are both physical objects, we both
have a colour, and we both exist.
This latter claim – the claim that we both exist – comes from the thesis that
everything exists, and exists in the same way. But there are some who think
that not everything exists in the same way. Pluralists about being think that
some things exist in different ways, or enjoy different ways of being. Of
course, even Pluralists may think that my computer and I exist in the same
way:1 Pluralism is often motivated by considerations of things even more
different than my computer and me. Some Pluralists – for example Russell
(1912, 91–100) and Moore (1903), 161–163 – think that concrete objects
and abstract objects exist in different ways. Others – for example Aquinas
(1947, q8, a3) – think that God and created things exist in different ways.
What it takes to be a Pluralist is just to think that there is more than one way
of being and, for each way of being, at least one thing exists in that way.2
Pluralism is at present the minority view; Monism, the view that there is
just one way to be, reigns. And Pluralism has recently come under fire.
Merricks (2019) has given three arguments against Pluralism. First, he
argues that Pluralists who do not accept a way of being that everything
has (hereafter ‘generic existence’) cannot state a Pluralism that posits a spe-
cific number of ways of being (Merricks 2019: §2). Second, he argues that
Pluralists who do accept generic existence thereby undermine the main mo-
tivation for Pluralism, and that their view is especially vulnerable to a classic
objection to Pluralism (Merricks 2019: §3, 601–2). Finally, he argues that
since Pluralists can’t accept generic existence (for the aforementioned rea-
sons), they can’t make claims about everything (594, 606). Builes (2019)
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1 Exceptions can be found in McDaniel 2018: Chapter 6. McDaniel’s Heidegger has it that
there is a way of being (Existenz) had by all and only Daseins (and that being a Dasein is
sufficient for being a person) (McDaniel 2018: 177). And a view he calls ‘Individualistic
Fragmentationalism’ has it that each person enjoys a fundamental way of being that
nothing else (and nobody else) enjoys (193). Both of these views have it that my computer
and I exist in different ways.
2 I’ll assume, just for ease of talking, that being and existing are the same thing. My
apologies to Meinong.
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thinks that the Pluralist can respond to Merricks’ arguments, but offers a
dilemma to Pluralists concerning whether Pluralism is a fundamental fact.
In §2, I distinguish several versions of Pluralism. In §3, I show which ver-
sion(s) of Pluralism can respond to Merricks’ arguments. In §4, I show how
the version of Pluralism that can respond to Merricks’ arguments should
respond to Builes’ dilemma.
2. The ways of thinking about ways of being
It might seem like there is one way to think about Pluralism; it is the view that
there is more than one way of being. According to the standard division,
Monists think that there is only one way to be, and Pluralists think there are
many ways to be. But that division is too coarse-grained to capture what
many Pluralists believe. These Pluralists help themselves to the notion of
naturalness – developed in Lewis 1983 – so it’s worth saying a bit about
naturalness before presenting the Pluralist views.
A predicate is more natural than another when the former ‘carves nature at
the joints’ better than the latter does.3 For example, the predicate ‘has mass’
is more natural than the predicate ‘has mass or is 2 metres tall’. The predicate
‘is a dog’ is more natural than the predicate ‘is the tallest building in the first
state to have a female governor’. Some predicates are perfectly natural.
Perfectly natural predicates are the ones that carve nature perfectly at the
joints. Perhaps ‘has –1 charge’ is perfectly natural.
The notion of naturalness might apply to predicates in virtue of those
predicates referring to properties which are more or less or perfectly natural,
or more or less or perfectly fundamental. (Fundamentality is akin to natur-
alness, and will play a role in §4.) But, as Lewis points out, even nominalists
can believe in a notion of naturalness. We might wonder whether, in addition
to predicates, naturalness applies to other bits of our language. Particularly
relevant to this paper is the question of whether some quantifiers might be
more or less natural than others, and whether there is a quantifier that is
perfectly natural.4
One might think there is only one way to be. Or one might think there is
only one perfectly natural way to be, and there are many ways that are less
natural. Or one might think that there are many ways to be, all equally
natural. (Or one might think something else.) Granted the notion of natur-
alness, we can formulate (at least) six views regarding being and whether
there are ways of being.
3 See Sider 2011 for a recent discussion of what it means to carve nature at the joints. A
helpful way to think about it is to think about what predicates God would use if you
asked her to give the very best description of the world. Presumably for a mereological
sum of hands and monuments’ would not show up, but ‘has negative charge’ might.
4 This is the question of Sider 2009: §10 and Sider 2011: especially Chapter 9.
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(WB1) There is only one way to be, and everything that exists exists in
that way.
(WB2) There is only one perfectly natural way to be, and everything that
exists exists in that way; there are other ways of being, but they are less
natural than the one way to be such that everything exists in that way.
(WB3) There are many ways to be, and no way to be is more natural than
any other.
(WB4) There are many ways to be, none of which is more natural than
any other, and one way to be such that everything exists in that way, and
the way to be such that everything exists in that way is less natural than
every other way to be.
(WB5) There are many ways to be and one way to be such that everything
exists in that way, and none of those is more natural than any other.
(Builes (2019: §5) calls this ‘Hybridism’.)
(WB6) There are no ways to be, or if there are, nothing exists in any of
the ways to be that there are.
It turns out that many of these views have been adopted. van Inwagen
(1998), 236ff and Merricks (2019) accept (WB1), Sider (2011: §5.3) and
Korman (2015: 48, 87–88) might be taken to accept (WB2), Turner’s
Pluralist (Turner 2010: especially 7–9) and Moore (1903), 161–163 accept
(WB3), McDaniel’s Heidegger (McDaniel 2018: §1.2, especially 24) accepts
(WB4), McDaniel’s Meinong, who adds a generic way of being (‘Quasisein’)
that ‘ . . . has as much right to be regarded as a fundamental expression as the
two inner ones’ to existence and subsistence, accepts (WB5) (McDaniel 2018:
37–38) and Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) and Turner (2011) accept
(WB6).
(WB1) is Monism. (WB3) is obviously (a version of) Pluralism. But (WB4)
also seems like (a version of) Pluralism, as does (WB5). (WB6) is Nihilism.
(WB2) is somewhere between Monism and Pluralism, and it could be classi-
fied as either.
I now turn to Merricks’ arguments against Pluralism. I think the arguments
succeed against (WB3), but not against (WB4).
3. Merricks’ arguments
Merricks (2019) first offers a dilemma against a particular version of
Pluralism – Pluralism that believes in exactly two ways of being. Let’s call
such a view ‘Pluralism-2’. The dilemma is:
(Merricks’ Dilemma) Does a Pluralist-2 also accept that there’s a generic
way of being such that everything exists in that way? (Merricks 2019: §2)
ways of thinking about ways of being | 3
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If not, he argues, the Pluralist-2 can’t state Pluralism-2, nor can she make
claims about everything. If so, he argues, then that (i) undermines the classic
motivation for Pluralism, (ii) makes Pluralism especially vulnerable to a clas-
sic objection and (iii) is inconsistent with what Pluralists have said.
Although we’ll take the second horn, let us briefly examine the first horn.
The Pluralist-2 wants to say that there are two ways of being. She will also
presumably want to say that everything enjoys one of those two ways of
being, and that each of those two ways of being has something that exists in
that way.5 Otherwise it is consistent with Pluralism-2 that nothing exists, or
that everything enjoys just one way of being, or that some things exist in
some third way of being. The natural way of stating Pluralism-2 in first-order
logic, with subscripts to denote different quantifiers corresponding to differ-
ent ways of being, is:
(PLURALISM-2) 8x(91y(y ¼ x) 92y(y ¼ x)) 91x(x ¼ x) 92x(x ¼ x)6
But there is a generic unrestricted quantifier in PLURALISM-2. And the first
horn of the dilemma doesn’t allow for a generic unrestricted quantifier. The
Pluralist-2 who accepts the first horn must re-state Pluralism-2, perhaps as
something like:
(PLURALISM-2\)81x(91y(y ¼ x) 92y(y ¼ x)) 82x(91y(y ¼ x) 92y(y ¼ x))
 91x(x ¼ x) 92x(x ¼ x)7
But PLURALISM-2\ doesn’t rule out some third (or fourth, or fifth, or . . . )
way of being that some things enjoy. And it doesn’t rule out things existing1
and existing2. So, Merricks concludes, the first horn of the dilemma is not an
option for the Pluralist-2 (Merricks 2019: 596). And the same goes for
Pluralism-n, for any n. A statement of it won’t rule out some n+1 way of
being, or things existing in multiple of the ways of being.
But note, as Merricks does, that while this dilemma generalizes to
Pluralism-n, for any n, it doesn’t generalize to all Pluralisms. A Pluralist
needn’t be a Pluralist-n, for some n. One could just be a Pluralist. One
could also think there are at least two ways of being, and not take a stand
on how many. That position can be stated (Merricks 2019: 606). Indeed, it is
the very position stated in PLURALISM-2\. One could think there are at least n
ways of being, for any n, and state that position. What Merricks’ dilemma
5 She may also want to say that everything enjoys exactly one of those two ways of being.
This stronger view would require modifications of the statements of Pluralism to follow.
6 In English: everything that exists either exists1 or exists2, and something exists1 and some-
thing exists2. The stronger version would add ‘:91x92y(y ¼ x)’.
7 In English: everything that exists1 either exists1 or exists2, and everything that exists2 either
exists1 or exists2, and something exists1 and something exists2. Again the stronger version
would require the addition of ‘:91x92y(y ¼ x)’.
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shows us is that Pluralists can’t state that there are exactly n ways to be, for
any n, without a generic unrestricted quantifier. And it shows us that
Pluralists can’t state that there are no more than n ways to be, for any n,
without a generic unrestricted quantifier.
So the Pluralist-n (for any n) and the Pluralist who wants to say that there
are no more than n ways to be (for any n) will want a generic unrestricted
quantifier. They will need to take the second horn of the dilemma. The first
horn ruled out PLURALISM-2, but the second horn of the dilemma accepts that
there is a generic unrestricted way of being such that everything exists in that
way, which is formally represented by ‘9’ and ‘8’. So PLURALISM-2 is back on
the table as a statement of Pluralism-2, and taking the second horn allows us
to make claims about everything.
Merricks gives three reasons that the Pluralist shouldn’t accept a generic
unrestricted quantifier. One reason is that ‘virtually all Pluralists of the past’
have not accepted a generic unrestricted quantifier (Merricks 2019: 603–4). I
won’t try to respond to this reason. Perhaps someone could do some exeget-
ical history of philosophy to show that, armed with a notion of naturalness,
(WB4) would have been acceptable to past Pluralists; I will not try to do so. I
will deal with the other two reasons, and concede to Merricks that past
Pluralists would not have liked (WB4). Nevertheless, if it can help us resolve
Merricks’ and Builes’ dilemmas, it might be the best version of Pluralism.
The second reason that Merricks says a Pluralist shouldn’t accept a generic
unrestricted way of being is that accepting a generic unrestricted way of being
undermines the motivation for Pluralism – that concrete and abstract things
are so different as to not enjoy a single way of being, that God and creation
are so different as to not enjoy a single way of being, and the like (601, 603).
In response, I think the (WB4) Pluralist can still state this reason, or at least
say something that captures the intuition behind it. Although (WB4)
Pluralism accepts that there is a way of being that concrete and abstract
things both enjoy, it says that that is not a very natural way of being. It’s
less natural, in any case, than the way of being that all and only concrete
things enjoy and it’s less natural than the way of being that all and only
abstract things enjoy. It is, as McDaniel (2018: 28) puts it, ‘akin to a mere
disjunction of the metaphysically basic ways of being’.8 So although the
Pluralist who accepts a generic unrestricted way of being that everything
enjoys can’t say that concrete and abstract things are so different that there
8 The (WB4) Pluralist then needs to say precisely what being akin to a mere disjunction is.
Merricks (2019: 11) argues that it cannot be being a mere disjunction. McDaniel (2018)
gives examples of features that are akin to mere disjunctions: being healthy, being flexible
and being elegant. These are analogous features; ‘they enjoy a kind of unity that merely
disjunctive features lack: their specifications are, to put it in medieval terms, unified by
analogy’ (51). So, for McDaniel, to be akin to a mere disjunction is to be an analogous
feature. Most of Chapter 2 of The Fragmentation of Being is dedicated to exploring what
it is to be an analogous feature and whether being is an analogous feature.
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is no way of being that they both enjoy, she can say that concrete and ab-
stract things are so different that the way of being that they both enjoy is
quite unnatural.
The third reason Merricks says a Pluralist shouldn’t accept a generic un-
restricted way of being is that it increases Pluralism’s vulnerability to an
objection to Pluralism. That objection is that ‘pluralists posit a difference
in being where there is instead but a difference in kind among entities that
exist in the same way’ (602–3). Once one accepts a generic unrestricted way
of being that everything enjoys, then since presumably one also accepts predi-
cates like ‘is abstract’ and ‘is concrete’ and ‘is divine’ and ‘is created’ and so
on, one can make the distinctions that the Pluralist wants to make without
the extra quantificational apparatus – without positing ways of being. In
response, I think the (WB4) Pluralist should agree that one can distinguish
objects by using predicates instead of quantifiers. However, she can say that
this is a less natural, less joint-carving way of putting things. The generic
quantifier is less natural than the others, and so any sentence that uses the
generic unrestricted quantifier is less natural than a sentence that refers to one
of the ways of being that not everything enjoys. The book of the world, then,
contains quantifiers referring to the many ways of being – not the generic
unrestricted quantifier.
So I conclude that Merricks has shown that the Pluralist who doesn’t
accept a generic unrestricted quantifier cannot state a Pluralism that posits
a particular number of ways of being nor can she state a Pluralism that posits
a maximum number of ways of being, though she can state a Pluralism that
posits a lowest number of ways of being. The Pluralist who does accept a
generic unrestricted quantifier can make claims about everything, and so she
can state a Pluralism that posits a particular number of ways of being and she
can state a Pluralism that posits a maximum number of ways of being. But in
order to respond to Merricks’ objections to Pluralists that accept a generic
unrestricted quantifier, such a Pluralist – a (WB4) Pluralist – ought to go in
for talk of naturalness and/or fundamentality. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll
suppress the ‘(WB4)’ for the rest of the paper and assume we’re talking about
(WB4) Pluralism.
4. Builes’ dilemma
Builes issues an additional dilemma to pluralists:
(Builes’ dilemma) Is [PLURALISM-2] a fundamental fact? (Builes 2019: 399)
The dilemma assumes two principles about fundamentality that come from
Sider (2011):
(PURITY) Fundamental facts only contain fundamental notions.
6 | bradley rettler
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(COMPLETENESS) Every non-fundamental truth holds in virtue of some fun-
damental truth.9 (Builes 2019: 398)
To further explain COMPLETENESS, Sider (2011) introduces the notion of
metaphysical semantics. A metaphysical semantics gives truth-conditions
for non-fundamental facts that appeal only to fundamental facts. So, for a
sentence S in a language L that contains non-fundamental expressions, a
metaphysical semantics for L contains something of the form: S is true in
L iff , where  contains no non-fundamental expressions. In this way sen-
tences with non-fundamental terms can be true, but made true by fundamen-
tal things in virtue of having a metaphysical semantics that gives truth-
conditions that only refer to those fundamental things. The metaphysical
semantics – the statements of the form ‘S is true in L iff ’ – are not funda-
mental, since they include the sentences (‘S’ above) that have non-fundamen-
tal expressions; so their being fundamental would violate PURITY. But the
truth-conditions (‘’ above) are fundamental.
So should Pluralists say that PLURALISM-2 is a fundamental fact?
If the Pluralist says ‘yes’, then, given PURITY, every expression in PLURALISM-
2 has to be a fundamental expression. There is a generic unrestricted univer-
sal quantifier in PLURALISM-2. So, given PURITY, the generic unrestricted uni-
versal quantifier is fundamental. We can define the generic unrestricted
existential quantifier in terms of the generic unrestricted universal quantifier.
So it seems that the Pluralist must accept that the generic unrestricted exist-
ential quantifier is fundamental.
Builes thinks saying ‘yes’ and accepting that the generic unrestricted exist-
ential quantifier is fundamental comes at a high price. But accepting that the
generic unrestricted quantifier is fundamental doesn’t entail believing that no
other quantifier is fundamental, or as fundamental. It is open to one who
accepts (WB5) to accept this – the generic unrestricted existential quantifier is
just as fundamental as the many other ways of being. Perhaps Builes’ argu-
ment gives us some reason to accept (WB5). Builes does, however, argue
against (WB5) in §5, saying that it is less parsimonious and undermines the
Pluralist response to Merricks’ arguments; so perhaps it will not turn out to
be better than (WB3) or (WB4).
But consider the second horn: saying ‘no’. Then, by COMPLETENESS,
PLURALISM-2 must have a metaphysical semantics, and truth-conditions for
PLURALISM-2 must contain only fundamental expressions. The generic unre-
stricted existential quantifier and the generic unrestricted universal quanti-
fier, we are supposing, are not fundamental expressions. So a metaphysical
semantics for PLURALISM-2 cannot make use of them in giving truth-conditions
for PLURALISM-2.
9 Of course, one could avoid Builes’ dilemma by rejecting either or both of these. See
Merricks 2013: §2 for an argument against the conjunction of PURITY and COMPLETENESS.
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Builes says that the Pluralist cannot give a metaphysical semantics for
PLURALISM-2. He rests this on an argument from Merricks, saying ‘the Pluralist
mustgive the truthconditions for the claim that everythingeither exists1or exists2
using only fundamental notions that do not include the notion of generic exist-
ence. But wait – this is the very task that Merricks argued that Pluralists cannot
do!’ (Builes 2019: 399). The argument fromMerricks that Builes is referring to is
the argument that the Pluralist who doesn’t accept a generic unrestricted quan-
tifier cannot state a Pluralism that posits exactly n ways of being, for any n
(Merricks 2019: §2). And, given PURITY, truth-conditions for PLURALISM-2
cannot contain a generic unrestricted quantifier.
First, I respond that the Pluralist can still give truth-conditions for the
claim that there is more than one way of being. She can say that there are
at least two ways of being such that at least one thing exists in each way. And
that can be a fundamental fact. That may be enough for many Pluralists.
Second, I suggest, the Pluralist-2 can give truth-conditions for the claim
that everything either exists1 or exists2 using only fundamental notions that
do not include the notion of generic existence. A metaphysical semantics has
four components: the sentence S, the language L, the truth-conditions , and
the statement that S is true in L iff . (The statement that S is true in L iff  is
what I’m calling the metaphysical semantics for S.) In the present case, S is
PLURALISM-2, L is English,  is PLURALISM-2\, and the metaphysical semantics
is that PLURALISM-2 is true in English iff PLURALISM-2\. S must contain non-
fundamental terms, and PLURALISM-2 does.  must not contain fundamental
terms, and PLURALISM-2\ does not. What about the metaphysical semantics?
Clearly it needn’t contain only fundamental terms, since it contains S, which
must contain non-fundamental terms.
The task is to give a sentence for  that’s (1) true iff PLURALISM-2 is
true and (2) doesn’t use generic existence. That sentence is PLURALISM-2\. It
clearly meets condition (2). Does it meet condition (1)? That is, is the follow-
ing true?
MSP:8x(91y(y ¼ x) 92y(y ¼ x)) 91x(x ¼ x) 92x(x ¼ x), 81x(91y(y
¼ x) 92y(y ¼ x)) 82x(91y(y ¼ x) 92y(y ¼ x)) 91x(x ¼ x) 92x(x
¼ x)
The Pluralist-2 thinks that MSP is true. This is because she thinks that
PLURALISM-2\ in the fundamental language is true when and only when
PLURALISM-2 is true in English. In the fundamental language, 91 and 92 and
81 and 82 quantify over everything, and they are not the same quantifier. And
whether MSP is true must be judged by the Pluralist-2’s own lights. The
Monist cannot demand that the Pluralist-2 rule out Monism in the funda-
mental language by using the generic unrestricted quantifier that the
Pluralist-2 doesn’t believe is a part of the fundamental language! That is to
beg the question against the Pluralist-2. So it meets condition (1).
8 | bradley rettler
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/analysis/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/analys/anz079/5770866 by U
niversity of W
yom
ing Libraries user on 12 M
arch 2020
So PLURALISM-2\ gives Pluralist-friendly truth-conditions for PLURALISM-2
that contain no non-fundamental expressions; in particular, PLURALISM-2\
doesn’t use a generic unrestricted quantifier. The Pluralist-2 believes that
everything either exists1 or exists2. So in PLURALISM-2\, by using 81 and 82,
she is quantifying over everything – even though she’s not saying that she’s
quantifying over everything. So the task is done.
Why does Builes claim that Merricks has shown that the Pluralist cannot
do this? Merricks does consider PLURALISM-2\. But he does not say that it fails
to state truth-conditions for PLURALISM-2. Rather, he says it will not work as a
statement of Pluralism-2. He says this because it is consistent with varieties of
Pluralism that accept more than two ways of being. So, he says, it will not
work as a statement of a Pluralism that accepts only two ways of being.
But, to respond to Builes’ dilemma, we do not need to state Pluralism-2 in a
way that Monists and Pluralists-n (for n 6¼ 2) cannot accept; we have already
stated it with PLURALISM-2. To respond to Builes’ dilemma, we must give a
metaphysical semantics for PLURALISM-2: we must give Pluralist-friendly truth-
conditions for PLURALISM-2 that contain no non-fundamental expressions.
PLURALISM-2\ does that. To demand that we offer a metaphysical semantics
for PLURALISM-2 that Monists and Pluralists-n (for n 6¼ 2) cannot accept is to
demand that the Pluralist-2 rule out Monism and Pluralism-n (for n 6¼ 2) in the
fundamental language. But that demand is unreasonable. As McDaniel (2018:
134) puts it, in the fundamental language we have to be able to ‘show’ that
Monism and Pluralism-n (for n 6¼ 2) are false, even though in the fundamental
language we can’t ‘say’ that they are false. The statement of Pluralism-2 should
rule out Monism and Pluralism-n (for n 6¼ 2). But that statement doesn’t have
to be a fundamental truth – only truth-conditions for Pluralism-2 do.
Compare the following example. Suppose someone believes that only mereo-
logical simples exist, and she believes that the predicate ‘is a part of’ does not
show up in the fundamental language. She would state her view as ‘Everything
lacks proper parts.’ But she would not think that is a fundamental truth, if she
accepts PURITY, since it contains a non-fundamental expression. So it must have
a metaphysical semantics. But the truth-conditions for ‘Everything lacks proper
parts’ can’t talk about proper parthood, and so can’t say that nothing has
proper parts. But that doesn’t show that it can’t be true, or that it can’t be
stated, or that it doesn’t have a metaphysical semantics. It just can’t be stated in
the fundamental language. But the fundamental language shouldn’t have to talk
about all the non-fundamental stuff; indeed, it cannot. The situation is similar
with Pluralism. PLURALISM-2\ talks about everything, but it doesn’t say that it’s
talking about everything. And it shouldn’t have to, since the (WB4) Pluralist
doesn’t think that the generic quantifier – the quantifier that can quantify over
everything – is fundamental.10
10 A Pluralist who thinks that the generic quantifier is fundamental (a (WB2) Pluralist and
maybe a (WB3) Pluralist) would respond to Builes’ dilemma by taking the first horn.
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Here’s a similar example. Suppose someone believes that only mereological
simples are quantified over by the fundamental quantifier. She also thinks the
sentence ‘There are tables’ is true in English, so she gives a metaphysical
semantics for it: ‘There are tables’ is true in English iff some simples stand
in relations R1, R2, R3, . . . The table-believer could insist that that doesn’t
guarantee that there are tables, since it doesn’t say that there are tables. But
that is to beg the question against this kind of mereological nihilist.
So, I conclude, the Pluralist can solve Builes’ dilemma. PLURALISM-2 is true,
but not fundamental. PLURALISM-2\ is a statement of truth-conditions for
PLURALISM-2 in the fundamental language. It doesn’t work as a statement of
Pluralism-2, but in the fundamental language one needn’t be able to state
Pluralism-2.
5. Conclusion
There are many ways of being an ontological pluralist.11 One way of being
an ontological pluralist is to accept a generic unrestricted quantifier and a
notion of naturalness or fundamentality, and say that the generic unrestricted
quantifier is less natural or less fundamental than the quantifiers for the many
ways of being. Those who do are able to solve both Merricks’ and Builes’
dilemmas.12
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Abstract
Monism about being says that there is one way to be. Pluralism about being
says that there are many ways to be. Recently, Trenton Merricks and David
Builes have offered arguments against Pluralism. In this paper, I show how
Pluralists who appeal to the relative naturalness of quantifiers can respond to
these arguments.
Keywords: metaphysics, ontology, being, naturalness, ontological pluralism
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/analysis/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/analys/anz079/5770866 by U
niversity of W
yom
ing Libraries user on 12 M
arch 2020
